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1 Introduction 
In Spain today, preschool attendance rates are among the highest in 
the European Union (EU) for children aged three, four and five (96 per-
cent, 100 percent, and 100 percent respectively). In contrast, Spanish 
child-care attendance rates are comparatively low for children aged two 
and under. Why is Spain at the vanguard of the European Union (EU) 
regarding preschool attendance rates for children aged three, four and 
five years? After briefly describing in the first section of this chapter the 
main Spanish preschool policies since 1975, in the second section I present 
the analytical framework to answer this question. In the third, fourth 
and fifth sections, I explain that in Spain most child-care provision has 
historically been part of education policy. Between the mid-1930s and 
1975, Spain was governed by a right-wing authoritarian regime headed 
by General FranciSCO Franco. A transition to democracy and a stable 
democracy followed the dictatorship. After 1975, policy-makers con-
tinuously expanded the programmes that were already in place: public 
preschool services for children under the age of mandatory education 
(six years). In postauthoritarian Spain, the context was favourable for 
the increase in public preschool supply because the Catholic Church, 
which is a principal actor in education, is interested in the expansion 
of preschooling, provided that part of it is private and subsidised by 
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the state. The major presence of women in civil sOciety and the increas-
ing strength of the women's movement mean that women now form 
a visible electorate that politicians usually take into consideration. As 
a result, policy-makers tend to support policies that could be seen as 
favourable to women, such as an expansion of public child care. 
Finally, in the sixth section of this chapter, I argue that preschool 
is not child care, and therefore, in Spain, working parents cannot rely 
only on preschool to combine work and family. I also identify two major 
barriers to an expansion of care in centres for the under-twos: societal 
views about the best care options for infants and toddlers, and a pool 
of grandmothers and immigrants who take care of very young children 
at home. Secondary literature and published primary data are the main 
sources of this chapter. 
2 Analytical framework 
Social policy is usually expanded and more infrequently restricted. 
This dynamic is captured by a concept used by social scientists: path-
dependency (Pierson, 2000; Rose, 1990). According to path-dependency 
analyses, in a given policy area several courses of action are possible 
while politicians are initially trying to solve a problem. But once a 
course of action (or path) is chosen, it is easier for policy-makers to 
advance a bit farther along the path than to start a completely new 
course of action. Several reasons explain the continuity of any given 
policy along the same path, among others that some individual and 
collective actors are interested in maintaining the status quo. These 
actors are the recipients of the social programme and the bureaucrats 
who administer it. Because these individual and collective actors share 
a specific goal (the maintenance and even expansion of the social 
policy), they can mobilise with relative ease to achieve this goal. At 
some point in time, dismantling the existing policy and/or initiating a 
new course of action may be almost impossible. 
At least three insights of the path-dependency literature are worth 
noting. First of all, time matters, and past decisions have consequences 
on future decisions. Thus, while studying policy-making at any given 
moment, it is also necessary to analyse the actions of former politi-
cians in the same policy area. Second, although policy-makers at any 
given point in time tend to follow the same path as their predecessors, 
the results of policy-making may be different at different times. For 
instance, politicians may initiate a social policy that covers only a 
limited category of beneficiaries. Decade after decade, subsequent 
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politicians include more categories of beneficiaries within the social 
scheme. Eventually, the whole population may be covered by such 
a scheme. Thus, a programme for only a small fraction of the popula-
tion may evolve after a long period of time into a very different pro-
gramme, such as a universal service. Third, context matters too. Some 
contexts are more favourable than others to an intense expansion of 
pre-existing policies, for instance, if numerous actors are interested 
in such an expansion, and no major actor wants to dismantle the 
pre-existing policy. 
With respect to the more specific comparative literature on welfare 
states, in general and with important exceptions, researchers have not 
studied education policy. Recently, education has been included in some 
welfare state studies (see, for instance, Esping-Andersen, 2007). This is 
the approach used in this chapter. Like other social policies, education 
may (or may not) help to erode social inequalities. Therefore, there is no 
reason to ignore education in studies of social policy-making. 
The literature on the origin and development of welfare states in 
Western countries has usually privileged the study of socioeconomic 
development and class politics as primary forces causing the establish-
ment and expansion of social policy (Castles, 1994, p. 19; Daly, 1999, 
p. 106; van Kersbergen, 1995, p. 1). The role played by organised religion 
in social policy-making has received less attention. In Western coun-
tries in modern times, states and churches have fought for control of 
the education system. Therefore, the study of organised religion is espe-
cially important to understanding education policy. 
Spain is a culturally homogeneous Catholic country. After the 
expUlsion of Jews in 1492 and of Muslims soon afterwards, no signifi-
cant religious community other than the Catholics has been openly 
active in Spain in the last four centuries. The majority of adult Spaniards 
consider themselves Catholic (77.6 percent in July 2007).1 Although the 
number of practising Catholics is much lower than the number of self-
declared Catholics, it is Significant: 15.8 percent of those self-declared 
Catholics or believers of other religions affirmed that they attended 
religious services (excluding social events such as weddings, first com-
munions, or funerals) almost every Sunday or religious holiday, and 
2.2 percent attended on various days during the week (Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociol6gicas, 2007). Part of the literature on the origin 
and development of welfare states identifies Christian democratic par-
ties as principal actors in the translation of Catholic social doctrine into 
actual social policy-making (Morgan, 2006; van Kersbergen, 1995).2 
However, in postauthoritarian Spain, the church has no direct political 
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representation, because no major Christian democratic party or trade 
union exists (Casanova, 1993). 
The literature on welfare states in the Western world argues that 
the influence of Catholicism on social policy-making has been very 
complex. A correlation has been found between Catholicism and the 
level of expenditure on social security transfers at some points in 
history (Castles, 1994, pp. 24-26). Catholicism indirectly influences 
the type of social policy, because Catholic social doctrine manifests 
at least three marked preferences regarding the sort of social policy 
to be established. Firstly, social provision should be implemented by 
organisations of civil society (especially those of the Catholic Church). 
Secondly, social provision should preserve status differences in society, 
for instance, because of the existence of different schemes for different 
types of workers. Thirdly, social provision should help families care for 
their members basically by providing them with income in case the 
head of the family is unable to earn a sufficient wage in the labour 
market, rather than replacing families in their caring functions by pro-
viding them with caring services. Regarding social policies that particu-
larly affect women, the Catholic hierarchy has historically supported 
the view that married women's place is mainly in the home taking care 
of their relatives. Thus, social policy should not interfere but reinforce 
the performance of this role (Castles, 1994; Daly, 1999; Morgan, 2006; 
van Kersbergen, 1995). 
3 Child-care policies in Spain after 1975 
Child care can be thought of as a labour-market, gender-equality or 
education policy. In Spain before and after 1975, education has been the 
predominant rationale. Since 1975, the main child-care policy has been 
an ever increasing supply of public preschool programmes for children 
under the age of mandatory schooling (six). These programmes are free 
of charge, full-day, and administered within the policy area of educa-
tion authorities. The absolute number and proportion of children who 
attend preschool programmes in public centres has increased inten-
sively since 1975. While this type of centre was attended by 347,026 
children younger than six in academic year 1975-1976, this figure had 
nearly tripled (991,626 children) by academic year 2006-2007. Seen 
from another perspective, in academic year 1975-1976, more than a 
third (38 percent) of children enrolled in preschool education attended 
public centres. In academic year 2006-2007, this proportion was nearly 
two-thirds (64 percent). The expansion of the supply of places in public 
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child care has taken place in a context characterised by the existence 
of a private sector. In academic year 1975-1976, the number of children 
enrolled in preschool education who attended private centres was 
573,310, while in academic year 2006-2007 the figure was 546,341.3 
In part as a result of the policy just described, Spanish preschool 
attendance rates (in public and private centres) for three-, four-, and 
five-year-olds are among the highest in the EU at 96 percent, 100 percent 
and 100 percent respectively (Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia, 2006; 
provisional data for academic year 2006-2007). In academic year 2002-
2003, four EU countries (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain) had 100 
percent of four-year-old children enrolled in pre-primary or primary 
education, while the EU-25 average was 14 paints lower (86 percent). 
In the same academic year, the Spanish participation rate of three-
year-old children in pre-primary or primary education (95 percent) was 
exceeded only by those of Belgium, France and Italy (100 percent in 
each of the three countries), and was 27 points higher than the EU-25 
average (68 percent) (Andren and Schmidt, 2005, pp. 8-9). Conversely, 
the proportion of Spanish children aged two or younger cared for in 
public or private centres is comparatively low: 4 percent for children 
younger than one year, 16 percent of children aged one year, and 30 
percent for those two years old (academic year 2005-2006; Ministerio 
de Educaci6n y Ciencia, 2007).4 
In democratic Spain, besides the pronounced expansion of the supply 
of public preschool programmes, the other most important change 
in the area of child-care policy has been territorial decentralisation. 
Under Franco, the state was highly centralised, but during the tran-
sition to democracy a broad process of devolution of powers from the 
central state to the regions (less so to municipalities) was set in motion. 
Since the early 1980s, some regional governments have been acquiring 
responsibilities previously assigned to the central state (for instance, 
education). The process of devolution of full responsibilities for education 
to all regions was completed in 2000.5 
4 The educational rationale of 
Spanish child-care policy 
As already noted, in Spain, child care has always been mainly an 
education policy independent of the political regime governing the 
country. In Franco's Spain, the gender equality argument was out of 
the question, since the regime actively opposed the advancement of 
women's rights and status. Divorce was abolished and the selling and 
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advertising of contraceptives were criminalised. Abortion was defined 
as a crime subject to a prison sentence. According to the official doctrine 
of the dictatorship, the ideal family was a hierarchical unit, because the 
authority within it rested with the father, who was supposed to be its 
sole (or at least its main) supporter. Motherhood was defined not only 
as the main family duty of women but also as women's main obliga-
tion towards state and sOciety. The role of mothering was perceived as 
incompatible with other activities, such as waged work. During the first 
phase of the Franco regime (between the second part of the 1930s until 
the late 1950s - early 1960s), the state took measures to prevent women's 
labour outside the home. For example, a married woman needed her 
husband's permission before signing a labour contract and engaging in 
trade. During the second phase of the Franco regime (between the late 
1950s - early 1960s and 1975), policy-makers approved some liberalisa-
tion measures related to women's status, such as the abolition of some 
obstacles regarding paid employment (for instance, banning married 
women from working and prohibiting women from practising some law 
professions) (Morcillo, 2000; Nash, 1991). 
Regarding children under the age of mandatory education, when 
Franco died in 1975, the central state already had a preschool policy 
within the policy area of education. A principal institution to formu-
late this policy was functioning: the Ministry of Education. (Limited) 
premises and staff to implement this policy also existed: preschool 
teachers and classes for children under the age of six in public schools. 
The path-dependency approach to policy analysis suggests that, after 
1975, central state policy-makers (and later regional authorities) found it 
easier to expand what was already in place than to invent a completely 
new policy from scratch. In fact, since the transition to democracy, 
the supply of places in public preschool centres has been expanded by 
parties of different ideological colours while in office at the central state 
level (although for different reasons): the centre-right coalition of parties 
Union of the Democratic Centre (Union de Centro Democratico, UCD) up 
to 1982, the social-democratic Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Espanol, PSOE) between 1982 and 1996, the conservative 
People's Party (Partido Popular, PP) between 1996 and 2004, and again 
the PSOE since then. In the 1970s and 1980s, public preschool places 
were provided especially for children aged four and five, while in the 
1990s and after 2000 these places were also increasingly given to children 
aged three. 
Governments formed by the UCD, PSOE and PP have understood 
preschool services as a necessary step for Spain to catch up with 
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surrounding countries since most EU(-15) member states are econom-
ically more developed. All three governing groups have thought that 
one of the reasons for Spain's relative backwardness was an education 
deficit. The social-democratic PSOE promoted public preschool mainly 
to diminish class inequality. Historically, access to nonmandatory 
education was sharply differentiated by class (de Puelles Benitez, 1999, 
pp. 368-369; McNair, 1984, p. 47; Medina, 1976, pp. 123, 130). The 
conservative pp maintained and increased the supply of publicly sup-
ported preschool. In the context of strong electoral competition from 
the PSOE, the conservatives did not want to be seen by the electorate 
as a party that defended the interests of affluent citizens who tend to 
use private child-care and preschool programmes (Valiente, 2002, p. 63; 
2003, p. 289). For the same reasons, regional governments of different 
ideological colours continued to expand public preschool programmes 
when powers on education were transferred from the central state to 
the regions.6 
5 The Catholic Church 
The Catholic Church is a key player in education, controlling the major-
ity of private centres (but not all). Private centres provide educational 
services to approximately a third of non-university students (Ministerio 
de Educaci6n y Ciencia, 2006, p. 3). In general, the Catholic Church is 
interested in the expansion of education, provided that a substantial 
part of it is private and subsidised by the state. 
Most private provision of non-university education is subsidised by 
the state. In academic year 2004-2005, 84 percent of non-university 
students in private education were pupils of subsidised centres (centros 
privados concertados). In the same academic year, 72 percent of non-
university students in subsidised private education were pupils attend-
ing religious centres. In exchange for state funding, subsidised private 
centres must use the same criteria as public centres to select students if 
the number of applicants exceeds the number of places; they must also 
supply education free of charge (this does not include extracurricular 
activities, school meals, or textbooks); and they must allow parents, 
students and school staff to participate in school decision-making. 
State subsidies are a very important source of income for providers of 
subsidised private education. On average, in academic year 2004-2005, 
the state covered 75 percent of current expenses of subsidised private 
centres (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2007a, p. 4). Up to the 1990s, 
the state subsidised mainly private mandatory education, but since 
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then the state has increasingly subsidised private preschool education 
as well. 
In sum, in postauthoritarian Spain, the Church has continuously 
demanded (and obtained) subsidies for its private education provi-
sion, including preschool services. In this way, two of the preferences 
of social Catholic doctrine have been satisfied. First, (part of) social 
policy is administered by organisations controlled by the Church, that 
is, confessional private schools. Second, in general and with important 
exceptions, access to private education is related to social class. Thus, 
the existence of a private education sector means the preservation of 
status differences within society. 
In postauthoritarian Spain, the Catholic Church has also constantly 
demanded that the state grant religion academic status in the school 
curriculum (Bonal, 2000, pp. 205-206; McNair, 1984, p. 144). Contrary 
to expectations derived from the literature on the origin and develop-
ment of welfare states, in the last three decades, the Catholic hierarchy 
has not vocally and continuously argued that preschool or child care is 
detrimental for children, or that mothers should take care of their off-
spring at home. It is not easy to explain why the Catholic Church has 
behaved in this way. Probably, the fact that the Church controlled a sig-
nificant sector of non-university education made the Church hierarchy 
more interested in expanding this sector than in locking women and 
their very young children in their homes. 
It is important to note that the ascendancy of the Church in politicS 
(and society) has been severely declining at least since the transition 
to democracy. Spain now belongs to the group of Western countries 
with secularised polities (and societies). The (imperfect) separation of 
church and the Spanish state is reflected in the Constitution. According 
to Article 16, Spain is a nondenominational state based on religious 
freedom. Nevertheless, this very same article also states that 'public 
authorities will keep in mind the religious beliefs of Spanish society' 
(that is, Catholicism). Article 16 also refers to the desirability of cooper-
ation between the state and the Catholic Church and the remaining 
denominations. The state's special treatment of the Catholic Church 
is mainly reflected in important state transfers, tax exemptions and 
financial support to most Catholic schools, hospitals, centres of social 
action and patronage for the arts. Thus the Catholic Church in Spain 
is not self-supporting but needs state money for its economic survival. 
The Catholic Church accepted the principle of nonconfessionality of 
the Spanish state and the constitutional regulation of state-church 
relations (Bedoya, 2006; Casanova, 1993, p. 117; Linz, 1993, p. 35). 
8
80 Child Care and Preschool Development in Europe 
The Catholic Church does not agree with some laws regulating moral 
matters, such as the laws that legalised divorce (1981), liberalised abor-
tion (1985), or permitted gay marriage (2005), but it has not made 
an enormous effort to have them revoked. Resistance by Catholics to 
these public policies has been more moderate in Spain than in other 
Western countries. The Catholic Church is not involved in the main 
political controversies of the country (with the possible exception of the 
nationalist question in the Basque country) and does not control the 
government agenda, but is not silent on matters the Church considers 
important (education and moral issues such as abortion and sexuality, 
among others) (Linz, 1993, pp. 32-48). 
The (imperfect) separation of church and state is a characteristic of 
the democratic regime established after the end of the dictatorship 
in 1975, but not of the right-wing authoritarian regime headed by 
Franco. During the first phase of the Franco regime, the church and the 
political regime supported each other. Catholicism was the official reli-
gion of the country. Freedom of worship was abolished. The state gave 
the church the prerogative of managing all matters regarding marriage 
and the separation of married couples. Catholic marriage was manda-
tory, with very few exceptions. The state allowed the Catholic Church 
to control part of the education system: a significant number of pri-
mary and secondary schools, but not most universities, which had been 
under state control at least since the mid-nineteenth century (McNair, 
1984, pp. 18-19). In all primary and secondary schools, the state made 
religious teaching and religious practices mandatory and education had 
to conform to the teachings of the Catholic Church. The Church was 
given the right to inspect private and public centres (McNair, 1984, 
. pp. 28-29). Sex-segregated schools were the norm, and boys and girls 
not only attended different schools but also had different curricula. The 
state supported the Catholic Church financially, and the Church was 
exempt from taxation. In turn, the Church supported the authoritarian 
regime, provided it with legitimacy, and declared the civil war (1936-
1939) a crusade between supporters of Christianity (Franco's followers) 
and the unfaithful and immoral (the Republicans). Some of the admin-
istrative cadres of the Francoist state came from Catholic lay organisa-
tions such as the Asociaci6n Cat6lica Nacional de Propagandistas and later 
Opus Dei. Catholic hierarchies occupied a salient place in official gov-
ernmental acts. State authorities ex officio attended religious ceremonies 
(Casanova, 1993, pp. 107-108; Linz, 1993, pp. 9-25). 
Relations between church and state changed in the second phase of 
the Franco regime. Part (only a part) of the Church distanced itself from 
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the regime, criticised the position and actions of the Church in the 
civil war, and even gave protection and support to political dissidents. 
Catholics became members of groups and parties of all ideological 
colours in opposition to the dictatorship. Thanks to this progressive 
distancing of a part of the Church from the political regime, when 
Franco died in 1975, the Church could align itself with other political 
and social forces in building a new democratic state (Casanova, 1993, 
pp. 114-117; Linz, 1993, pp. 25-32). 
6 Women in civil society and the 
women's movement 
Women are increasingly active in organisations of civil society, whether 
in women-only groups or in mixed associations. Thus, women now con-
stitute a visible electorate that politicians often take into consideration 
when calculating what policies they support or oppose. As for the large 
presence of women in mixed associations in civil society, for example, 
on average, women outnumber men in the so-called third sector dedi-
cated to social causes (Perez Diaz and Lopez Novo, 2003, pp. 214-217, 
231-233,241-242). The women's movement is made up of one branch 
which is explicitly feminist and another branch which is not. The latter 
is formed by housewives' organisations, widows' associations, mothers' 
movements, and cultural and religious associations, among others. This 
branch is currently thriving in terms of number of members and degree 
of activity (Ortbals, 2004). 
The first groups of the explicitly feminist branch of the women's 
movement (hereafter referred to as the feminist movement) were set up 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the period of liberalisation of the 
authoritarian political regime. Many of the first feminists were active in 
the opposition to the dictatorship, where they encountered illegal left-
wing political parties and trade unions. These have been the (uneasy) 
allies of the feminist movement ever since (Threlfall et al., 2005). 
In the last three decades, the feminist movement has influenced 
gender equality policy-making mainly due to its involvement with 
left-wing political parties. Many feminists mobilised within both 
feminist groups of civil society and left-wing political parties. When 
these reached power, some of their feminist activists and leaders 
occupied decision-making positions in the state from which they 
could advance an agenda of gender equality. Alternatively, feminists 
within left-wing political parties endlessly pressurised male activists 
and leaders to take gender equality into consideration when choosing 
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their policy objectives (Threlfall, 1996; Threlfall et al., 2005). The 
feminist movement has also intervened in the gender equality pol-
icy area mobilising public opinion in favour of the need to improve 
women's status (Trujillo Barbadillo, 1999). 
Since the transition to democracy, child care has been an issue of 
only moderate priority for the feminist movement. Child care helps 
women to combine work and family. Therefore, feminists in all Western 
countries including Spain have demanded child-care services. But in 
Spain, the existence of the right-wing authoritarian regime helped move 
Spanish feminists away from issues such as motherhood and child care 
later on. After 40 years of being literally bombarded with the idea of 
mothering and caring as the most important task in women's lives, the 
last thing Spanish feminists wanted to do after the dictatorship was to 
pay a lot of attention to the issues of motherhood and child-rearing. 
Women's liberation was then understood as opening the range of con-
cerns that define women's lives, such as waged work, political participa-
tion, or control of their bodies. This definition carefully skirts the place 
of motherhood and child care in the life of the newly liberated Spanish 
(Valiente, 2002, p. 65; 2003, p. 288). 
Even though child care has not been a top priority for the feminist 
movement through the whole postauthoritarian period, preschool is 
seen by important sectors of public opinion not only as an education 
policy but also as a policy favourable to women. This is so because 
preschool is used (together with other options) by working parents to 
combine work and family, and an increasing number of women work 
for pay. Thus, an expansion of public preschool services is usually per-
ceived by broad sectors of the citizenry as a policy that helps women. 
Cuts in public preschool provision would be interpreted as a policy 
against women and therefore out of the question in a country where 
women form an ever increasing part of civil SOciety, and both branches 
of the women's movement are increasingly visible. 
7 Limitations of preschool 
and future challenges 
As stated earlier, in Spain, the supply of places in free public preschool 
was increased substantially over the last three decades. Nevertheless, 
the very definition of these institutions as schools rather than 
child-care centres has limited their utility for working parents. 
Preschool programmes provide solid educational services for children 
aged three to five years. Addressing the educational needs of young 
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children (from all social classes) is a laudable goal, and its achieve-
ment should be celebrated. However, preschool programmes cannot be 
used by parents as perfect substitutes for child care, because preschool 
holidays are considerably longer than work holidays and preschool 
hours are shorter than the work hours for full-time jobs (some-
times much shorter and interrupted by a break). Even if the Spanish 
women's employment rate (51.6 percent) is lower than the EU(-25) 
average (56.5 percent), most Spanish women who work for wages (77.3 
percent) have full-time jobs (third quarter 2005 data; Romans and 
Hardarson, 2006, pp. 3-5). Policies other than preschool education to 
help parents combine work and family are seriously underdeveloped 
in Spain (Lean, 2007). 
At least two obstacles will hinder the expansion of child-care services 
in the near future for the under-threes: widespread assumptions regard-
ing the centrality of mother-care for small children; and an important 
number of grandmothers and immigrants who provide child care. It is 
still commonly believed by both women and men in Spain that care 
by the mother is indispensable at least at the beginning of the child's 
life, and that the (full-time) employment of mothers jeopardises the 
upbringing of very young children. For instance, in a 2002 survey, 
slightly over half of the adult population of both sexes strongly agreed 
or agreed with the statement that a preschool child will suffer if his/her 
mother works (data from Morgan, 2008, p. 29). 
When mothers do not stay at home day and night to take care of 
their children, the second preference of many parents is that another 
woman, often a grandmother, replaces the working mother in the 
home. Grandmothers are frequently available to look after their 
grandchildren because the majority of women in these age groups 
are full-time housewives, and many young parents live near their par-
ents. Other children are also cared for by domestic workers, who also 
perform household duties. This option is only available to members 
of the upper-middle or upper classes who can afford these services. 
Immigrants are available to perform this type of job. On 1 January 
2007, 45.12 million people lived in Spain, of whom around 10 percent 
were foreigners (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2007b; provisional 
data). Labour market experts estimate that approximately 600,000 
people (overwhelmingly women) are employed as domestic workers in 
Spain (El Pais 21 May 2007, p. 102). However, the official figure is lower: 
in July 2007, around 271,500 people contributed to the special scheme 
of social security for domestic workers (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos 
Sociales, 2007). 
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8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown that the main child-care public policy 
after 1975 has been an ever increasing supply of full-day, public pre-
school free of charge. This policy already existed before 1975 although 
it was considerably less developed than it is today. As the literature on 
path-dependency would predict, pre-1975 public preschool provision 
was expanded in postauthoritarian Spain by governments of different 
ideological colours at the central state level and later at the regional 
level. In part as a result of this policy, Spain is at the vanguard of the 
EU regarding preschool education coverage for children aged three 
(96 percent), four (100 percent) and five (100 percent). In the last years 
of the dictatorship, the majority of children under six did not attend 
preschool. In academic year 1971-1972, preschool attendance rates 
for children aged three, four, and five were 12 percent, 42 percent, and 
61 percent respectively (Perez Pefiasco, 1976, p. 224). Thus, by expanding 
pre-existing programmes, postauthoritarian policy-makers converted a 
programme of limited coverage into a nearly universal scheme. 
From the literature on path-dependency, one can infer that context 
matters while explaining the intensity with which policy-makers 
continue along the same path as their predecessors. In postauthoritarian 
Spain, the intense expansion of public preschool services can be under-
stood if one considers the fact that the Catholic Church is interested 
in the expansion of preschool services, provided that part of them are 
private and subsidised by the state. This policy is perceived as beneficial 
to women in a country where more and more women are active in civil 
society. 
I have also identified some factors that mitigate the demand of 
public child care for children aged two or under. An important share 
of the population thinks that very young children should be taken care 
of at home. Mothers who do not work for wages, grandmothers and 
immigrants are providing this type of child care in different types of 
families. Cultural specificities and class differences are at play here. On 
the one hand, many Spanish people find it natural for grandmothers 
to take care of their very young grandchildren while the mothers of 
these children are working for pay. In other EU countries, many citizens 
think that family obligations should not be stretched that far (Millar 
and Warman, 1995). On the other hand, in Spain, families in the upper-
middle and upper classes prefer their toddlers and infants to be cared 
for at home by domestic workers rather than in centres by professional 
staff, while exactly the opposite is true in other EU member states. In 
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Spain (and possibly other Mediterranean countries), most members of 
the upper-middle and upper classes feel comfortable when being served 
by others at home, while in other countries (for example, the Nordic 
states) most members of the very same classes feel quite uncomfortable 
and even embarrassed in the same situation. To investigate these and 
other cultural dimensions beneath the surface of child-care policies is 
one of the next steps in the research on social policy from a comparative 
perspective. 
Notes 
*This chapter contains research undertaken by the project 'Gender and 
citizenship in multicultural Europe: The impact of the contemporary 
women's movements (FEMCIT), financed by the European Commission's Sixth 
Framework Program (EC contract number 028746-2). 
1. In the same opinion poll, 1.4 percent of the interviewed identified 
themselves as belonging to other religions, 12.4 percent non-believers and 
6.8 percent atheist, and 1.8 percent did not answer. 
2. For a critique of the importance given to Christian Democratic parties by 
this literature, see Castles (1994, pp. 23-24) and Daly (1999, p. 106). 
3. Calculated by Celia Valiente from data of Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 
(1977) pp. 101-103; Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia (2006) p. 3 (provisional 
data for the academic year 2006-2007). 
4. See comparative data in Morgan (2008), pp. 31-32. 
5. Other child-care policies such as tax exemptions for child-care expenses are 
much less important than the supply of preschool places in public centres. 
Due to space constraints, only the latter is analysed in this chapter. 
6. However, some regional governments were more committed to public pre-
schooling than others. Due to space constraints, this paper does not analyse 
regional variations. 
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